Topic

Quantum foundations for cryptography

The physics that makes quantum cryptography work: qubits, measurement, no-cloning, entanglement, Bell tests, entropy and the quantum one-time pad.

Qubits, bases and measurement

A qubit is a two-level quantum system with state $|\psi\rangle=\alpha|0\rangle+\beta|1\rangle$, $|\alpha|^2+|\beta|^2=1$. Measuring in the basis $\{|0\rangle,|1\rangle\}$ gives 0 with probability $|\alpha|^2$ and 1 with probability $|\beta|^2$ (the Born rule), and the state collapses to the result. For photons the qubit is usually a polarization:

BasisState 0State 1Photon polarization
Rectilinear (Z, “+”)$|0\rangle$$|1 angle$horizontal ↔ / vertical ↕
Diagonal (X, “×”)$|+\rangle=\tfrac{|0\rangle+|1\rangle}{\sqrt2}$$|-\rangle=\tfrac{|0\rangle-|1\rangle}{\sqrt2}$45° / 135°
Circular (Y)$\tfrac{|0\rangle+i|1\rangle}{\sqrt2}$$\tfrac{|0\rangle-i|1\rangle}{\sqrt2}$right / left circular

The Z and X bases are mutually unbiased: a state prepared in one gives a perfectly random outcome in the other, $|\langle +|0\rangle|^2=\tfrac12$. This single fact is the engine of BB84: a spy who guesses the wrong basis learns nothing and leaves a disturbed state behind.

Key ideaMeasurement is not passive. Unless the state already is an eigenstate of the measured observable, measuring changes it irreversibly. This is the physical basis of eavesdropper detection.

No-cloning, uncertainty and information–disturbance

No-cloning theorem. No physical process maps every unknown state $|\psi\rangle|0\rangle\mapsto|\psi\rangle|\psi\rangle$. Proof sketch: a unitary $U$ preserves inner products. If it cloned two states $|\psi\rangle,|\phi\rangle$, then

$$\langle\psi|\phi\rangle=\langle\psi|\phi\rangle^{2}$$

which forces $\langle\psi|\phi\rangle\in\{0,1\}$: states must be orthogonal or identical. Non-orthogonal states, which BB84 deliberately uses, cannot be copied. (Wootters–Zurek, Dieks, 1982.) Related results: no-deleting, no-broadcasting (mixed states) and no-signalling (entanglement cannot carry messages).

Uncertainty. For non-commuting observables $\Delta A\,\Delta B\ge\tfrac12|\langle[A,B]\rangle|$. Modern QKD proofs use entropic uncertainty relations: if Bob can predict the outcome of a $Z$ measurement well, Eve cannot know the outcome of an $X$ measurement, and conversely.

Information–disturbance principle. Any measurement that extracts information about non-orthogonal states must disturb them. Quantitatively, the more Eve learns, the larger the error rate Bob sees. QKD turns this tradeoff into a security statement.

Entanglement, Bell states and CHSH

A two-qubit state is entangled if it cannot be written $|\psi_A\rangle\otimes|\psi_B\rangle$. The four Bell states are maximally entangled, e.g.

$$|\Phi^{+}\rangle=\tfrac{1}{\sqrt2}(|00\rangle+|11\rangle),\quad|\Psi^{-}\rangle=\tfrac1{\sqrt2}(|01\rangle-|10\rangle)$$

Measuring both halves in the same basis gives perfectly correlated results, though each result alone is uniformly random. The CHSH quantity

$$S=E(a,b)-E(a,b\prime)+E(a\prime,b)+E(a\prime,b\prime)$$

obeys $|S|\le2$ for any local hidden-variable model, but quantum mechanics reaches $|S|=2\sqrt2\approx2.83$ (Tsirelson’s bound). Violating CHSH certifies that the correlations are not pre-arranged and that no third party can hold a complete copy of the outcomes. This is the security principle of Ekert’s E91 protocol and of device-independent QKD.

NoteEntanglement cannot send information faster than light: each party’s local results are random, and correlations appear only when results are compared over a classical channel.

Density operators, entropy and distinguishability

Imperfect or partially known states are described by a density operator $\rho\ge0$, $\mathrm{Tr}\rho=1$. Eve’s view of Alice’s qubits, when Eve does not know the basis, is the maximally mixed state $\rho=I/2$. Key quantities:

  • Von Neumann entropy $S(\rho)=-\mathrm{Tr}\,\rho\log_2\rho$: 0 for pure states, 1 bit for $I/2$.
  • Binary entropy $h(p)=-p\log_2p-(1-p)\log_2(1-p)$, the cost of an error rate $p$.
  • Trace distance $D(\rho,\sigma)=\tfrac12\|\rho-\sigma\|_1$: the maximal probability advantage in telling two states apart. Secrecy of a key $K$ against Eve’s system $E$ is measured by $D(\rho_{KE},\,\tau_K\otimes\rho_E)\le\varepsilon$, where $\tau_K$ is the uniform key distribution.
  • Holevo bound $\chi\le S(\rho)-\sum_x p_xS(\rho_x)$: the most classical information that can be extracted from an ensemble of quantum states.

The quantum one-time pad

To encrypt an unknown quantum state with a classical key $(a,b)\in\{0,1\}^2$, apply $X^aZ^b$. Averaging over the four keys,

$$\tfrac14\sum_{a,b}X^aZ^b\,\rho\,Z^bX^a=\tfrac{I}{2}$$

for every $\rho$: the ciphertext carries no information. Thus 2n bits of key encrypt n qubits perfectly (Ambainis–Mosca–Tapp–de Wolf 2000), and with fewer key bits perfect secrecy is impossible. Decryption applies the Paulis in reverse. This is the quantum counterpart of Shannon’s classical one-time pad, which requires a key at least as long as the message.

Key ideaBoth pads need fresh uniformly random key. QKD supplies that key. Authentication of the classical channel also consumes key, which is why QKD is described as key growing.

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